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I have had the benefit of the papers in advance of today and have read them carefully before the hearing.
I have listened to the case presented by the Appropriate Authority.
I have carefully considered the documentary evidence provided to me, including:
Former Det Supt Kessell was arrested on Sunday 4 August 2024 on suspicion of driving a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road whilst unfit through drink.
Former Det Supt Kessell was driving a motor vehicle on the A352 Wareham Road, Wool, Dorset.
Members of the public reported the vehicle being driven in an erratic manner and swerving across the road. The vehicle was stopped by officers with former Det Supt Kessell identified as the driver. He was found to smell strongly of alcohol and was unsteady on his feet, as a result he was arrested on suspicion of driving a mechanically propelled vehicle whilst unfit through drink.
Following arrest former Det Supt Kessell was taken to Weymouth police station where he underwent an evidential drink drive procedure. During this procedure he provided two specimens of breath for analysis with the lowest reading being 115 micrograms of alcohol in 100 millilitres of breath, the legal limit being 35 micrograms in 100 millilitres of breath.
Former Det Supt Kessell was charged on Monday 5 August 2024 with driving a motor vehicle after consuming so much alcohol that the proportion of it in his breath exceeded the prescribed limit contrary to section 5(1)(a) of the Road traffic Act 1988 and Schedule 2 of the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988. He appeared at Southampton Magistrates’ Court on Friday 13 September 2024 where he pleaded guilty to the offence of driving a motor vehicle when alcohol level above the legal limit.
Sentencing will be on Tuesday 5 November 2024.
This conviction was at the criminal level of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.
Behaving in this way, committing, and being convicted for this offence at court, discredits the police service and significantly undermines public trust and confidence.
Former Det Supt Kessell accepts that this conviction breached the standards of professional behaviour in relation to discreditable conduct, he also accepts that this breach of standards amounts to gross misconduct.
I therefore consider that former Det Superintendent Kessell has breached the Standards of Professional Behaviour in respect of:
Former Det Supt Kessell committed the offence as convicted and can be in no doubt whatsoever that his actions were unlawful and wrong. In addition, it is unacceptable for police officers, whether on or off duty, who are responsible for upholding the law, to break the law themselves and to do so brings discredit on the service. This seriousness of this conviction reflects the gravity of the breaches of the Standards of Professional Behaviour.
I have reminded myself that gross misconduct is a breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour so serious that dismissal would be justified. That doesn’t necessarily mean that dismissal will follow, but it does mean that the behaviour is such that it is right for dismissal to be considered and if dismissal were the outcome, it would be justified.
Applying that definition, I find the matter proven as gross misconduct.
Having considered the matter fully and having had regards to the nature and severity of the breach of the Standards of Professional Behaviour, my decision is that, had he remained a serving officer, former Det Supt Kessell would have been:
The College of Policing Guidance on Outcomes in Police Misconduct Proceedings is a clear document that sets out the stages of the decision-making process. I have applied those guidelines and that process to my decision-making in this case.
There are three stages to determining the appropriate sanction:
The first stage of deciding on the outcome is to assess the seriousness of the proven conduct by reference to:
The second stage is to keep in mind the purpose of the police misconduct regime. This has three elements:
The police misconduct regime is not designed to punish police officers – it is about the reputation and standing of the profession as a whole.
The third stage is to choose the outcome that most appropriately fulfils the purpose given the seriousness of the conduct in question and must be imposed fairly and proportionately and must be used to achieve organisational justice.
This should be the least severe outcome that deals adequately with the issues identified, while protecting the public interest.
I have also considered former Det Supt’s Kessel’s record of service during this decision-making process.
At all times I must be aware of and adhere to human rights and equality legislation. That is, of course, part of my approach at all times as a police officer.
Every case is different, and I have made my decision on the specific facts of this individual case.
I have started by assessing the seriousness of the conduct.
Former Det Supt Kessell has committed a criminal offence and has pleaded guilty at the first hearing upon the burden of proof of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, therefore on that factual basis, I determine that former Det Supt Kessell would have known that he was committing the offence, is wholly and solely responsible for his actions, knowing that they were wrong.
I have also considered other factors in his culpability, and I find that culpability in this case is increased when considering the rank held by former Det Supt Kessell and his previous role within Dorset Police as Head of Professional Standards.
Former Det Supt Kessell also accepts that his conviction for driving whilst over the prescribed limit amounts to discreditable conduct, as do the actions that led to his conviction.
Given all these additional factors and the facts of this case, I determine that the culpability of former Det Supt Kessell is high.
Former Det Supt Kessell’s actions have caused harm to public trust and confidence as well as reputational harm to both Dorset Police and national policing. It is entirely unacceptable for police officers who are responsible for enforcing the law to break the law themselves. Any conviction is serious and likely on its own to have an adverse impact on public confidence in policing.
The most important purpose of imposing disciplinary sanctions is to maintain public confidence in, and the reputation of, the policing profession as a whole. This dual objective must take precedence over the specific impact that the sanction has on the individual whose misconduct is being sanctioned.
The fact that former Det Supt Kessell was off duty when the offence was committed does not lessen the harm to trust and confidence in policing, since this is inimical to the values of modern policing and the Standards of Professional Behaviour.
The facts of this case are known by the wider public by the virtue of the criminal court trial. The nature of the offending is such that the public must have trust and confidence in policing and that such matters will be dealt with thoroughly and professionally.
Det Supt Kessel’s conduct was such that though no physical harm was caused to anyone, the public were put at risk as indicated by the calls made to Dorset Police by members of the public alarmed by the manner of his driving, which could have caused serious harm.
Given these factors, I deem the level of harm to be high.
Having considered the details of this case, I have recorded the following factors that tend to worsen the circumstances of the case:
I have considered the Regulation 54 response from former Det Supt Kessell and have recorded the following mitigating factors in this case:
Because the culpability and harm are so high, and there is insufficient mitigation that would tend to reduce the gravity of former Det Supt Kessell’s conduct and behaviour in a way that means I would consider that taking no disciplinary action would be justified. (This would have been my only alternative option given that the officer has already resigned.)
Having assessed the mitigation, I consider that the misconduct:
I explained earlier that the decision-making process has three stages. I now move to the second stage, which is to keep in mind the purpose of the police misconduct regime.
As I mentioned before, this has three elements:
In behaving in the way he did, as I have described above, and being convicted of a criminal offence in respect of that behaviour, former Det Supt Kessell has discredited himself, Dorset Police and national policing.
This high level of misconduct undermines public confidence in policing as well as our reputation.
The public could not have confidence in former Det Supt Kessell following conviction for this criminal offence. Nor would the public have confidence in policing if we appeared not to take such criminal convictions and such behaviour by a police officer seriously, which I know would be the case if I imposed any lesser sanction today.
A lesser sanction would not serve to uphold high standards and deter misconduct that is so out of keeping with colleagues’ and the policing’s ethics and values.
I now move to the third stage of decision-making, which is to choose the outcome that most appropriately fulfils the purpose given the seriousness of the conduct in question.
In this case, the officer has resigned from the Force and as such I can only consider two outcomes:
Where the finding is gross misconduct and disciplinary action is imposed, this can only be that the former officer would have been dismissed if still serving. No other sanctions can be enforced. If the finding is gross misconduct, but I determine that dismissal is not justified, then no action will be taken and the gross misconduct will be recorded.
For the reasons set out above, it is clear to me and it is my decision that determining that no disciplinary action would be taken would be an inadequate outcome for behaviour and a criminal conviction of this kind.
Therefore, nothing less than dismissal, had former Det Supt Kessell remained serving, would fulfil the purpose of the police misconduct regime.
Had former Det Supt Kessell remained a serving officer, my decision would have been that his conduct amounted to gross misconduct and the outcome would have been:
Having considered the representations made, I have decided that there is no reason why the outcome of this hearing cannot be published on the College of Policing Barred List.
The wording will state:
“Officer convicted of driving a motor vehicle over the prescribed alcohol limit.”